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1 Introduction
The recent nancial crisis has highlighted the need to better understand the drivers of systemic
(nancial) risk and its reciprocal relationship with real economic activity. Therefore, spotting
macro-systemic-risk linkages through a reliable and well-behaved framework can make it possible
to devise macro-prudential tools and policies. Recently, both policymakers and academics have
begun to discriminate between the sizeof a nancial institution and its systemic importance. For
example, Bernanke (2009) focuses on nancial institutions that are too interconnected to fail,
while Rajan (2009) uses the term too systemic to fail. Despite this divergence in terminology,
during periods of severe distress, there is an incentive to prevent the collapse of risk factors
(e.g. nancial institutions, and/or exchange rates) because such failures can pose signicant risks
to the nancial system, and consequently to the broader real economy. Accordingly, a trend
has developed towards focusing on the macro-prudential perspective of banking regulation (see
Aspachs et al., 2007; Goodhart et al., 2005, 2006; Lehar, 2005). However, as the great recession
has highlighted, policymakers and academics do not fully understand how risk spreads within
and between nancial systems, or which institutions can become systemically important or too
interconnected to fail. Moreover, there is insu¢ cient knowledge about the e¤ects and desirability
of particular regulatory macro-prudential measures. Accordingly, the contribution of this paper is
three-fold: rst, it empirically uncovers the directionality and persistence of distress surrounding
the great recession; second, it quanties the reaction of the macro-economy to nancial system
shocks; and third, the paper unearths feedback e¤ects from the macro-economy to the (in)stability
of a banking system.
The literature on contagion and systemic risk in the banking system can be classied into
two categories: (i) direct channels, such as interbank markets, that systemically link banks;
(ii) indirect channels, such as similar portfolio holdings in bank balance sheets. Studies in the
rst category focus on the contagion e¤ect; that is, an extreme event in one risk factor may
cause an extreme event in other risk factors. Specically, Allen and Gale (2000) and Dasgupta
(2004), focus on modeling the interbank market; while Cifuentes et al. (2005) go a step further,
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and consider two channels: (1) similar portfolio holdings, and (2) mutual credit exposure. This
latter study shows that contagion propagates through changes in asset prices; that is, the indirect
channel dominates. The second category focuses on the modeling of systemic risk and indirect
channels. Lugano¤ and Schreft (2001) assume that the return of one banks portfolio depends on
the portfolio allocation of other banks. Given this assumption, they show that crises spread due
to forward-looking behavior. De Vries (2005) starts from the fat-tail property of the underlying
assets shared by banks, and argues that this creates the potential for a systemic breakdown (for
comprehensive surveys on systemic risk modeling, see De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000; Allen et al.,
2009).
Recent developments in multivariate EVT (mEVT ) provides the opportunity to investigate
extreme co-movements, which go to the heart of this paper. For instance, mEVT has been applied
to measure risk contagion across di¤erent nancial markets in Longin and Solnik (2001), Hartman
et al. (2004), and Poon et al. (2004); while Hartmann et al. (2007) apply multivariate EVT to
the analysis of bilateral relations within the banking system. More recently, the Global Financial
Stability Report published by the IMF in April 2009 has moved beyond bivariate relations by
looking at the interconnection of nancial distress within a system consisting of three banks
(International Monetary Fund, 2009).
Several measures of systemic risk have recently appeared in empirical studies. For instance,
Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) construct a metric for nancial stability, which they call the
PAO ("probability that at least one bank becomes distressed"). However, the PAO only reects
the probability of having at least one extra distress, without specifying the size of the systemic
impact. Zhou (2010) extends the PAO measure by proposing a systemic impact index(SSI),
which measures the expected number of bank failures in a banking system given that one particular
bank fails. The di¤erence between the PAO and the SSI is that the latter is more explicit about
"systemic impact". The research herein applies the multivariate extreme value theory (mEVT )
methodology to a portfolio composed of 30 banks from around the world, and calculates a risk-
stability index (RSI) based on Garita and Zhou (2009) and Zhou (2010). This index quanties
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systemic risk in a nancial system, and for the purposes herein, is based on forward-looking
price information stemming from credit default swap (CDS) spreads. One advantage of utilizing
this risk-stability index, is that it reveals the importance of di¤erent risk factors (e.g. banks) in
causing systemic risk, where the potential for a systemic breakdown of the nancial system can
be either weak or strong (see De Vries, 2005), depending on whether the "conditional probability
of joint failure" fades away or remains asymptotically (see Garita and Zhou, 2009). Accordingly,
the international monetary and nancial system can be described as being relatively stable in the
former case, while in the latter case it is more fragile.
The results indicate that, on average, Asian banks create slightly more instability to the
nancial system, very closely followed by U.S. banks, and then by European banks. Second, an
increase of the RSI lowers the federal funds rate, while increasing the slope of the term structure.
This result suggests that monetary policy reacts to nancial instability concerns. The results of
the panel VAR also indicate that a higher conditional probability of joint failure, and an increased
sensitivity of market participants to higher failure risk deteriorates the general market by lowering
the returns to the S&P500. Moreover, the perception of market participants that the VIX is the
"fear index" is corroborated by the results, since a positive shock to the risk-stability index
increases the implied volatility of the market. Third, the paper unearths feedback e¤ects from the
macro-economy to the (in)stability of a banking system. These latter set of results indicate that
leaning against the windcan help reduce the systemic risk of a nancial system. Last but not
least, the results show that an improvement in the returns to the S&P500, as well as a reduction
of market volatility, reduces the sensitivity of market participants to failure risk.
The remainder of the paper evolves as follows: Section 2 will discuss the measures of depen-
dence employed herein. Section 3 provides and discusses the results stemming from the Risk-
Stability Index, and also looks at the directionality of contagion and the persistence of distress
surrounding "the great recession". Section 4 takes advantage of the time-series properties of the
Risk-Stability Index, and estimates a panel VAR that links the instability of a nancial system
to the macro-economy. Lastly, section 5 concludes.
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2 Measures of Dependence
2.1 Multivariate EVT: tail dependence
To assess V aR at a low probability level p, univariate EVT can be used to model the tail behavior
of a "loss". However, since the focus herein is on "systemic risk", I omit the details on univariate
risk modelling (for a formal analysis of univariate EVT, see Embrechts et al., 1997). Multivariate
EVT (mEVT ) takes into account more than the tail behavior of each individual risk factor, since
it also looks at the extreme co-movements among them. Moreover, this approach makes it possible
to nd (possible) contagion e¤ects stemming from "distress" in one risk factor in relation to other
risk factors in a system. Let X = (X1; :::; Xd) denote the losses of d individual risk factors, where
each risk factor Xi follows a univariate EVT setup with its own tail index i and scale function
ai(t). Therefore, for any x1; x2; :::; xd > 0, as  ! 0, we have:
P (X1 > V aR1(x1); or X2 > V aR2(x2); or; :::; or Xd > V aRd(xd))

= L(x1; x2; :::; xd) (1)
where VaR denotes the value-at-risk of Xi, and L is a nite positive function. The L-function
characterizes the co-movement of extreme events that Xi exceeds a high threshold V aRi(xi).
(x1; x2; :::; xd) controls the level of the level of high threshold, which in turn controls the direction
of extreme co-movements. However, this time around the values will be delimited between 1 and
the number of risk factors d; the estimation procedure follows Huang (1992). Following Hartman
et al. (2004), assume a system of two banks with loss returns X and Y . From the denition in
(1) we have
lim
!0
P (X > V aRx(x); or Y > V aRy(y))

= L(x; y) = L(1; 1) for x = y = 1 (2)
As noted by De Haan and Ferreira (2006), 1  L(1; 1)  2. A value for L(1; 1) equal to 1 indicates
complete tail dependence. If L(1; 1) equals 2, then it indicates tail independence. In the case there
is an interest in looking at a multidimensional setting (e.g. the e¤ects of one banks failure on
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the rest of the nancial system), as is the case in this paper, then equation (2) can be modied
accordingly. For an exposition of how the L-function is connected to the modern instrument of
dependence modeling - the copula - see Zhou (2010).
Risk-Stability Index (RSI)
Building on the mEVT framework previously discussed, I construct a risk-stability index based
on Garita and Zhou (2009) and Zhou (2010). As stated in the introduction, this index makes it
possible to quantify the e¤ect that a "failure" of any risk factor can have on an entire nancial
system, be it economy-wide or worldwide. For expositional purposes on the construction of the
RSI, assume that a nancial system consists of three banks. From equation (1) we know that
P (X1 > V aR1(x1); or X2 > V aR2(x2); or X3 > V aR3(x3))

= L(x1; x2; x3)
For bank Xi, the RSI is dened as:
RSI = lim
!0
E(number of crises in X2 and X3 j X1 is in crisis) (3)
Denote  = 1fXi > V aRi()g as Xi being in crisis, for i = 1; 2; 3. Using this to rewrite (3), we
obtain:
RSI1 = lim
!0
E(2 + 3 j 1 = 1) (4)
Note that the above expression can be rewritten as the sum of two expectations as follows:
E(2 j 1 = 1) + E(3 j 1 = 1) (5)
Rewriting (5) in terms of probabilities, and by using equation 11 (see the Appendix) we get:
RSI1 = lim
!0
P (2 = 1 & 1 = 1)
P (1 = 1)
+
P (3 = 1 & 1 = 1)
P (1 = 1)
= lim
!0
2   P (2 = 1 or 1 = 1)

+
2   P (3 = 1 or 1 = 1)

(6)
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By using equation (1) in the above expression, it is easy to show that:
RSI1 = 2  (d  1) 
X
i 6=j
Li;j(1; 1) (7)
or in the three-bank example:
RSI1 = 2  L(1; 1; 0) + 2  L(1; 0; 1)
= 4  L(1; 1; 0)  L(1; 0; 1)
An RSI close to d  1 means that risk-factor i has a high inuence on the nancial system, while
an RSI close to 0 implies a negligible inuence of risk-factor i on the nancial system.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Empirical Setup and Data
The well-being of the banking sector is (arguably) reected in credit default swap spreads, since
CDS spreads are a type of insurance against credit risk.1 However, it is worth pointing out that
there are those who argue against the reliability of CDS spreads as a trustworthy indicator of
a rmsnancial health. The main criticism being that CDS spreads may overstate a rms
fundamental risk when: (i) the CDS market is illiquid, and (ii) when the nancial system
is frothing with risk aversion. Even though these types of arguments might be accurate, they
can become self-fullling factors if they have a real e¤ect on the eagerness of the market to
nance a particular rm (Segoviano and Goodhart, 2009). Consequently, this can lead to a
real deterioration of a rms nancial health, as we have experienced throughout the 2007-2010
nancial crisis. Additionally, even though CDS spreads may overshoot, they do not generally
1A CDS is similar to a put option written on a corporate bond, and like a put option, the buyer is protected
from losses incurred by a decline in the value of the bond stemming from a credit event. Accordingly, the CDS
spread can be viewed as a premium on the put option, where payment of the premium is spread over the term of
the contract. More specically, CDS spreads are considered as determinants of default risk as well as liquidity risk
(Das and Hanouma, 2006; Hull et al., 2004). Moreover, a long stream of research, starting with Merton (1974),
has established a strong link between credit risk markets and equity markets.
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stay wide of the mark for long, where the direction of the move is by and large a good distress
signal. Therefore, the analysis to follow is based on an articially constructed nancial system
composed of 30 banks from around the world. These banks are included because they are the
most important banks in various countries for which CDS spreads are available for the longest
time period. The daily CDS spreads (all at 5-year maturity in USD) range from February 1,
2002 until July 22, 2010, and are obtained from Markit. The chosen banks are listed in Table 1
alongside the descriptive statistics of their CDS spreads.
From Table 1, we can observe that all daily CDS spreads exhibit high kurtosis relative to the
kurtosis of the normal distribution, which is 3. This indicates that the CDS spreads may follow a
heavy-tailed distribution. Moreover, the skewness of the CDS spreads is positive, indicating that
the heavy-tailedness comes from the right-hand side of the distribution - high premiums paid by
the protection buyer to the seller. Interestingly, from the descriptive statistics, we can also discern
a large variation on the market perception of riskiness of the banks. The top four risky banks in
the list   Woori, Shinhan, Hana, and Morgan Stanley   are approximately two to three times
more risky than the "safest" banks, DBS and HSBC.
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is imperative to calculate the number of high-ordered
statistics k, by using an estimator for the L(1; 1) function. The standard approach in the litera-
ture is to look at the L(1; 1) function for di¤erent k, and for all the bilateral relationships, with
the aim to "let the tail speak for itself".2 The solution to this trade-o¤ for each bilateral relation-
ship yields a k = 45, which implies a quantile of  = k
n
= 9%3. Moreover, in order to quantify the
evolution of "(in)stability", a 500 day sub-sample moving (weekly) window is used to construct a
time-series for the Risk-Stability Index (see Table 2 in the Appendix for the descriptive statistics
of the RSI).
2This is the same technique as for choosing the tail-index with a Hill-plot (see Hill, 1975), in which we have a
trade-o¤ between "too small" or "too large" k. If k is "too small", then we choose too few observations and the
variance of the estimator is large. If on the other hand, k is "too large", then we are incorporating "non-extreme"
observations (i.e. observations from the middle of the distribution), and therefore we would impose a bias to the
estimator.
3I also performed the analysis with a 200 day sub-sample moving (weekly) window. The quantile for this
exercise was  = 20200 = 10%. Moreover, the results that follow stayed relatively unchanged.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of CDS Spreads (in bps) for 30 Major Banks
Bank N Mean SD Skew. Kurt. Min Max
BBVA 2206 45.65 51.08 1.93 7.22 7.77 308.05
BNP Paribas 2207 32.59 31.40 1.37 4.15 5.33 170.74
BOA 2207 60.68 66.65 1.86 6.67 8.09 400.25
Citi 2207 93.48 127.22 2.23 8.25 7.31 697.62
Credit Suisse 2176 54.85 49.55 1.41 4.61 9.01 267.19
DBS 2173 40.05 38.76 1.87 6.56 4.06 223.06
Deutsche Bank 2207 47.22 42.91 1.22 3.39 9.44 205.11
Erste 2042 71.78 88.58 1.89 6.93 9.90 503.73
Goldman Sachs 2207 84.31 84.24 2.20 8.37 18.49 633.10
Hana 2060 115.23 125.76 2.36 8.77 13.25 863.00
HSBC 2207 40.60 41.02 1.45 4.44 5.06 212.31
IBK 2010 102.77 116.39 2.42 9.30 12.60 848.13
ING 2190 44.20 41.45 1.44 4.19 4.37 205.20
JPMorgan 2207 58.81 42.00 1.32 4.55 11.41 250.23
KDB 2206 95.35 105.44 2.71 11.33 12.32 841.40
KEXIM 2206 94.16 104.30 2.71 11.31 11.93 832.18
Kookmin 2190 106.76 112.05 2.50 10.01 12.40 857.39
Lehman Brothers 1727 71.42 79.97 3.10 15.20 18.41 739.64
Mizuho 2014 56.42 44.17 0.61 2.09 5.88 180.83
Morgan Stanley 2207 108.37 140.60 3.73 24.97 18.14 1478.20
Nomura 2044 84.41 107.77 2.12 7.11 8.79 487.87
Santander 2207 48.87 47.18 1.35 4.47 7.55 267.29
Scotia 1703 49.67 51.23 1.24 3.00 9.12 169.74
Shinhan 1981 116.43 127.13 2.29 8.39 13.66 852.86
SocGen 2207 40.64 41.79 1.20 3.30 5.86 220.48
Standard Chart. 2176 54.22 60.57 2.25 8.91 5.44 365.87
Tokyo Mitsu. 2207 61.86 50.40 0.85 2.70 5.77 218.00
UBS 2207 52.39 69.27 1.87 6.32 3.96 372.25
Unicredito 1969 49.34 51.94 1.48 4.80 7.30 291.43
Woori 1996 129.99 136.69 2.21 8.12 12.27 881.67
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3.2 Distress to Financial System
As previously mentioned, the risk-stability index makes it possible to quantify how the "failure"
of a bank can a¤ect a nancial system, be it economy-wide or worldwide.4 In simple terms, the
risk-stability index gives an estimation of the number of risk-factors that would "catch a cold",
given that a specic risk-factor "sneezes". Therefore, a risk-stability index (equation 7) close to
d  1 means that risk-factor i has a high inuence on the nancial system, while an RSI close to
0 implies a negligible e¤ect of risk-factor i on a portfolio (or nancial system).
Figure 1: Risk-Stability Index Time-Series Surrounding the "Great Recession". Average RSI for
Asia, Europe, United States. The vertical dashed lines indicate, from left to right: Implosion of Bear
StearnsHedge Funds, and when SMBSwere uncovered in Europe; Collapse of Bear Stearns; Collapse
of Lehman Brothers.
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An immediate result that stands out from Figure 1 is the severity of the banking crisis sur-
rounding "the great recession". As the RSI indicates, the global nancial system was severely
4More generally, the RSI can also be used to quantify the e¤ect that a "failure" of any risk-factor (e.g. stocks,
or currencies) can have on any portfolio.
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unstable surrounding the events related to demise of Bear Stearns, and the discovery of sub-prime
mortgage backed securities around the world. The collapse of Lehman Brothers also had a sig-
nicant impact in exacerbating systemic risk; however, this impact was slightly less severe than
the shocks emanating from the gradual collapse of Bear Stearns. The RSI also indicates that in
the two years prior to the beginning of "the great recession", the banking system was already
experiencing severe bouts of distress (in contrast to the period beginning in the summer of 2009,
when systemic risk had declined and remained, thereafter, at a low level). Last but not least, it
is worth pointing out that throughout the entire period shown in Figure 1, banks tended to a¤ect
about 9 other banks, on average; this implies an average infection rate of 31% (Asian banks have
an infection rate of 34%, while European and U.S. banks have an infection rate of 30% each).
Once the crisis began, around the summer of 2007, the average infection rate, up to the summer of
2009, increased to 45% on average. However, looking at averages masks the fact that systemic risk
and nancial instability can arise from anywhere, irrespective of risk-factor and/or geographical
location. (For an graphical overview for each individual bank, see Figures 2   4).
Delving deeper into the individual banking reveals that for the US banking system (see Figure
2), and more specically for Bank of America, Citi, and JPMorgan, the higher levels of systemic
risk started with the bankruptcy of New Century Financial (at the time the largest sub-prime
mortgage lender in the United States). However, Figure 2 also shows that for Goldman Sachs,
Lehman Brothers, and Morgan Stanley, it was the implosion of the Bear Stearn Hedge funds
(the "High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund", and the "High-Grade
Structured Credit Fund") that led to higher systemic risk. The collapse of Lehman Brothers was
most harshly felt by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Citi (see Figure 2).
For both European and Asian banks, Figures 3 and 4 show that the implosion of the Bear
Stearn Hedge Funds, and the discovery of sub-prime mortgage backed securities (SMBS) in port-
folios of banks and hedge funds around the world, is what led to the dramatic increase in systemic
risk (ultimately being felt as a "credit-crunch"). Interestingly, the collapse of Lehman Brothers
only seems to have moderately a¤ected European banks. However, this event did create a large
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increase in systemic risk for Asian banks. The next section delves deeper in the directionality of
systemic risk.
3.3 Directionality of Distress
In this subsection, I aim at uncover the directionality of distress by employing, for tractability
purposes, 8 periods of 500 days each (with a one-year overlap). The results of this particular
exercise are presented through Figure 5, which shows how the directionality of contagion to
the nancial system has evolved through the time surrounding "the great recession". This is
accomplished by looking at how many banks will experience a "tail-event" at time t, given that
bank "i" experienced a "tail-event" at t  1.
Figure 5: Directionality of Contagion - the gure shows the consequences to the banking system
conditional on bank i "failing" one period before (see footnote 5 for period coding). For example,
1   2 (on the x-axis) shows the repercussion to the system in period 2, given that bank i "fails" in
period 1.
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Figure 55 conrms that banks also a¤ect the nancial system with a lag; however, they do so
at irregular intervals and with di¤erent magnitudes. This implies that the system is constantly
under stress, where the source of the stress varies from period to period. Figure 5 also shows
that the systemic impact of a tail-event in the banking system was higher in the year preceding
"the great recession", since if a bank had "failed" in period 5, at least ten other banks would
have experienced the same tail-event one period later. These results are corroborated by the facts
discussed in sub-section 3.2, where we discovered that systemic risk began to build around the
beginning of 2007. Interestingly, the lagged e¤ect of the failure of Lehman Brothers is somewhat
negligible, less than ve banks su¤ered (a period later) because if its collapse.
3.4 Persistence of Distress
In order to capture the persistence of distress for bank i in a nancial system, we need to capture
systemic risk in a bivariate setting (in this case, systemic risk with itself).6 I do this through
the conditional probability of joint failure, which is a special measure of two-dimensional tail
dependence (see the appendix, and Garita and Zhou, 2009), displayed here as Figure 6.
The result stemming from the CPJF, and as shown in Figure 6, indicate that, during the "great
recession", the Japanese bank Mizuho experienced the most persistence of distress with an average
CPJF of 78%. In 2006, Mizuho started incurring massive losses on subprime investments; and in
2008, it lost more than US$6 billion on subprime investments, the most among Japans top banks.
Mizuho was followed by Lehman Brothers (average CPJF = 36%) from the USA, which displayed
an increasing pattern of persistence of distress as the crisis progressed. By the time it collapsed in
September 2008, Lehman Brothers was fully systemic with itself. At the lower end of persistence
are the Swiss banks CreditSuisse (average CPJF = 4%) and UBS (average CPJF = 5%),
followed by ING (average CPJF = 5%), Unicredito (average CPJF = 5%), and JPMorgan
(average CPJF = 6%).
5The x-axis of Figure 5 is coded as follows: 1 = Feb 1, 2002 to Jan 1, 2004; 2 = Jan 16, 2003 to Dec 15, 2004;
3 = Jan 1, 2004 to Nov 30, 2005; 4 = Dec 16, 2004 to Nov 15, 2006; 5 = Dec 2, 2005 to Nov 1, 2007; 6 = Nov 20,
2006 to Oct 17, 2008; 7 = Nov 6, 2007 to Oct 5, 2009; 8 = Aug 19, 2008 to July 22, 2010.
6All other bilateral results stemming from the CPJF are available upon request.
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Figure 6: Persistence of Distress - the gure shows the consequences to bank i, given that it experi-
enced a "tail-event" one period before (see footnote 5 for period coding).
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Table 3 indicates that banks are highly interlinked especially within geographical borders. For
example, Asian banks tend to experience the most persistence of distress on average, with a 22%
conditional probability of joint failure at time t, given that the same Asian bank experienced
distress at t   1. Within Asia, Korean banks have a propensity to create and experience higher
systemic risk for themselves (CPJF = 25%). Asian (Korean) banks are followed by U.S. banks
with a 16% CPJF, and then by European banks with an 10% CPJF, on average. These set of
results corroborate Hartmann et al. (2007), who argued that in a more integrated banking system
(e.g. the United States) area-wide systemic risk is higher, and that the lower overall spillover risk
in Europe is due to the weak extreme cross-border linkages.
From Table 3 we can also discern how banks are a¤ecting each other across regions. The Figure
indicates that Asian banks are the most contagious for Europe (CPJF = 18%), followed by US
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banks (CPJF = 17%). However, US banks do not lag that far behind their Asian counterparts,
since when a US bank experiences a "tail-event" in period t  1, a European or Asian bank will
experience the same tail event in period t with a CPJF of 17%, on average. Lastly, European
banks seem to be the less contagious for both Asian and US banks (average CPJF = 11:5%).
Table 3: Directionality of Bilateral Contagion - Average CPJF Within and Across Regions
Asia Bankst Asia-ex-Kor-Bankst Kor. Bankst Europe Bankst US Bankst
Asia Bankst 1 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.18 0.17
Asia-ex.Kor-Bankst 1 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.14 0.14
Kor. Bankst 1 0.23 0.21 0.25 0.20 0.20
Europe Bankst 1 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.11
US Bankst 1 0.18 0.15 0.20 0.16 0.16
4 VAR Analysis
This section implements a panel-data vector autoregression methodology (see Holtz-Eakin et al.,
1988; Love and Ziccino, 2006) in order to uncover the feedback e¤ect from the banking system
to the rest of the economy. This procedure merges the traditional VAR and panel-data method-
ologies, by allowing for endogeneity and for unobserved individual heterogeneity. However, when
applying the VAR approach to panel data, it is crucial that the underlying structure be the same
for each cross-sectional unit (Love and Ziccino, 2006). Since this constraint is likely to be violated
in practice, one way to overcome the restriction is to allow for individual heterogeneity; that is
by introducing xed e¤ects in the levels of the variables. However, due to the lags of the depen-
dent variables, the xed e¤ects are correlated with the regressors; therefore, the usual approach
of mean di¤erencingwould create biased coe¢ cients. Therefore, in order to avoid this problem,
the panel VAR methodology uses forward mean-di¤erencing, also known as the "Helmert proce-
dure" (see Arrellano and Bover, 1995; Love and Ziccino, 2006). This transformation preserves
the orthogonality between the transformed variables and the lagged regressors; thereby allowing
the use of the lagged regressors as instruments and the estimation of the coe¢ cients through a
system GMM.
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The impulse-response functions describe the reaction of one variable to the innovations in
another variable in the system, while holding all other shocks equal to zero. However, since
the actual variancecovariance matrix of the errors is unlikely to be diagonal, it is necessary to
decompose the residuals in such a way that they become orthogonal, in order to isolate shocks
to one of the variables in the system. The usual convention is to adopt a particular ordering
and allocate any correlation between the residuals of any two elements to the variable that comes
rst in the ordering.7 The identifying assumption is that the variables that come earlier in
the ordering a¤ect the following variables contemporaneously, as well as with a lag, while the
variables that come later a¤ect the previous variables only with a lag. In other words, the
variables that appear earlier in the system are more exogenous, and the ones that appear later
are more endogenous. Finally, to analyze the impulse-response functions we need an estimate of
their condence intervals. Since the matrix of impulse-response functions is constructed from the
estimated VAR coe¢ cients, their standard errors need to be taken into account. Accordingly,
the standard errors of the impulse response functions and the condence intervals are generated
through Monte Carlo simulations.
The panel VAR employs the RSI time-series (see Figures 1   4), and the following nancial
market variables (from St.Louis FRED and CBOE): the short rate (e¤ective federal funds rate),
the term spread (di¤. between 10-year and 3-month Treasury constant maturity rates), the
market return (returns on the S&P500), and the VIX, which is the implied market volatility.
The number of lags in the panel VAR system equals 2, and is selected through the Schwarz
Bayesian Information Criteria.
The reaction of the macroeconomy and the market to banking system shocks are as follows
(see column 1 in Figure 7): an increase of the risk-stability index lowers the federal funds rate,
while increasing the slope of the term structure; this suggests that monetary policy reacts to
nancial instability concerns. The results of the panel VAR also indicate that a higher conditional
probability of joint failure, and an increased sensitivity of market participants to higher failure
7The procedure is known as the Choleski decomposition of the variancecovariance matrix of residuals, and is
equivalent to transforming the system into a recursiveVAR (see Hamilton, 1994).
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risk deteriorates the general market, by lowering the returns to the S&P500. Last but not least,
the perception of market participants that the VIX is the "fear index" is corroborated by the
results, since a positive shock to the risk-stability index increases the implied volatility of the
market.
Figure 7: Impulse-Responses of a one standard deviation shock for 2-lag Panel VAR (errors are 5%
on each side generated by Monte Carlo with 1000 replications). RSI = risk-stability index; FFR =
e¤ective federal funds fate; T.Spread = di¤erence between 10 year and 3 month treasury constant
maturity Rate; SP500 ret = returns on the SP500; VIX = implied volatility of the market.
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As is well known, the VAR framework allows for a feedback e¤ect (see row 4 in Figure 7) from
the macro-economy and the general nancial market to the banking system. This feedback e¤ect
shows that an increase in the federal funds rate (used as a proxy for the global interest rate)
reduces the risk-stability index. This indicates that "leaning against the wind" decreases the
instability of the nancial (banking) system. Moreover, the results also indicate that an improve-
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ment in the returns to the S&P500, as well as a reduction of the VIX (i.e. of market volatility),
reduces the sensitivity of market participants to failure risk. The variance decomposition (Table
4) conrms the above-mentioned results. More specically, the RSI explains about 5:5% of inter-
est rate movements, especially at longer horizons (30 weeks). However, the RSI only has marginal
explanatory power of the returns to the S&P500 and the VIX. On the other hand, the returns to
the S&P500 explain more of the risk-stability index variation than any other variable (especially
at longer time horizons), followed by the VIX.
Table 4: Variance Decomposition - variation in the row variable explained by column variable
Step-Ahead RSI FFR T.Spread SP500ret VIX
RSI 10 0.947 0.003 0.001 0.040 0.013
FFR 10 0.025 0.470 0.290 0.110 0.110
T.Spread 10 0.046 0.007 0.900 0.030 0.014
SP500ret 10 0.001 0.003 0.060 0.930 0.006
VIX 10 0.003 0.001 0.010 0.710 0.270
RSI 20 0.810 0.004 0.004 0.140 0.043
FFR 20 0.050 0.230 0.340 0.230 0.144
T.Spread 20 0.060 0.020 0.820 0.060 0.035
SP500ret 20 0.001 0.003 0.060 0.930 0.006
VIX 20 0.002 0.001 0.030 0.710 0.260
RSI 30 0.760 0.006 0.006 0.180 0.054
FFR 30 0.050 0.150 0.350 0.300 0.160
T.Spread 30 0.060 0.040 0.730 0.110 0.060
SP500ret 30 0.001 0.003 0.06 0.930 0.006
VIX 30 0.002 0.001 0.040 0.700 0.250
Note: RSI = Risk Stability Index; FFR = E¤ective Fed Funds Rate;
T. Spread = Di¤. between 10 year and 3 month treasury constant maturity
rate; VIX = implied volatility of the market.
5 Conclusion
The macro-prudential view, which elicits explicit supervision of "asset prices" and the stability
of the nancial system, has by now gained wide acceptance among economists. Nonetheless,
implementing macro-prudential regulation depends, largely, on the operational feasibility. Despite
this obstacle, the research herein o¤ers a good foundation and a useful starting point towards
understanding the rapport between nancial (in)stability, systemic risk, and the real economy.
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Accordingly, the contribution of this paper to the literature has been three-fold: rst, it em-
pirically uncovers the directionality and persistence of distress surrounding the great recession,
where the results indicate that, on average, Asian banks create slightly more instability to the
nancial system, very closely followed by U.S. banks, and then by European banks. Second, it
quanties the reaction of the macro-economy to nancial system shocks. An increase of the RSI
lowers the federal funds rate, while increasing the slope of the term structure. This result suggests
that monetary policy reacts to nancial instability concerns. The results of the panel VAR also
indicate that a higher conditional probability of joint failure, and an increased sensitivity of mar-
ket participants to higher failure risk deteriorates the general market by lowering the returns to
the S&P500. Moreover, the perception of market participants that the VIX is the "fear index" is
corroborated by the results, since a positive shock to the risk-stability index increases the implied
volatility of the market. Third, the paper unearths feedback e¤ects from the macro-economy to
the (in)stability of a banking system. These latter set of results indicate that leaning against
the wind can help reduce the systemic risk in/of a nancial system. Last but not least, the
results show that an improvement in the returns to the S&P500, as well as a reduction of market
volatility, reduces the sensitivity of market participants to failure risk.
The paper has also underscored that systemic risk varies from period to period, thus supporting
the idea that nancial (in)stability is a continuum. Therefore, the monitoring of nancial stability
within and between economies should be a counter-cyclical continuous process. This analysis must
be wide-ranging, probing all risk-factors that inuence the nancial system; furthermore, it should
be intended at the early detection of nancial vulnerabilities, which can arise (from) anywhere
and at any time, as this paper has quantied.
Another aspect that continues to be debated by academics and regulators is whether regulation
should be aimed at institutions that are either "too big to fail" or "too interconnected to fail".
While not directly tested herein, it seems that "too big to fail" is not a major factor in explaining
the instability of a nancial system. However, "too interconnected to fail", does seem to be of
more importance. This is something that future research will have to uncover.
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Appendix
Conditional Probability of Joint Failure
Garita and Zhou (2009) dene the "conditional probability of joint failure" (CPJF), which is a
special measure of two-dimensional tail dependence, as follows: given that at least one risk-factor
"fails", the CPJF is dened as the conditional probability that the other risk-factor will also
"fail". Let X = (X1; X2; :::; Xd) represent the losses of d number of individual risk factors, then,
the corresponding V aR (value at risk) at probability level  of any two variables are V aRi() and
V aRj(). We then dene:
CPJF i;j= lim
!0
P (X i> V aRi() and Xj> V aRj()jX i> V aRi() or Xj> V aRj()) (8)
which can be rewritten as
CPJFij = E[j  1]  1 (9)
where
E[j  1] = lim
!0
P (Xi > V aRi()) + P (Xj > V aRj())
1  P (Xi  V aRi(); Xj  V aRj()) (10)
is the dependence measure introduced by Embrechts et al. (2000), and rst applied by Hartman
et al. (2004). Under the mEVT framework, the limit in (8) and (10) exists (see De Haan and
Ferreira, 2006, Ch. 7). A higher CPJF between two risk-factors indicates that a "failure" of these
two institutions is more likely to occur at the same time; moreover, the CPJFs may vary, which
highlights the di¤erent linkages during crisis periods. In the two-dimensional case, the CPJF can
be written as
CPJF = lim
!0
P (X1 and X2)
P (X1 or X2)
= lim
!0
P (X1) + P (X2)  P (X1 or X2)
P (X1 or X2)
= lim
!0
 +    L(1; 1)  
L(1; 1)  
=
2
L(1; 1)
  1 (11)
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The CPJF always lies between 0 and 1. If it is zero, then the probability of joint failure is
negligible; however, if it is one, then the "failure" of a risk factor in a portfolio will always go
hand in hand with the downfall of the other risk factor. An important point to keep in mind
before proceeding, is that conditional probabilities do not necessarily imply causation; however,
this set of bilateral conditional probabilities of joint failure do provide important insights into the
interlinkages and the likelihood of contagion between risk-factors in a portfolio (e.g. banks in a
nancial system).
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Risk-Stability Index Descriptive Statistics and Graphs
Table 2: RSI Descriptive Statistics for 30 Major Banks
Bank Mean SD Skew. Kurt. Min Max
BBVA 7.92 5.85 1.02 3.42 0.78 26.09
BNP Paribas 9.23 5.66 0.79 2.98 0.96 26.29
Bank of America 8.96 5.84 0.62 2.56 1.09 25.62
Citi 9.04 6.13 0.55 2.34 1.24 25.78
Credit Suisse 8.99 5.81 0.71 2.94 0.56 25.96
DBS 9.07 5.41 0.63 2.77 1.07 26.29
Deutsche Bank 8.67 5.39 0.90 3.37 1.04 25.96
Erste 9.23 6.20 0.67 2.41 1.33 26.29
Goldman Sachs 8.55 5.56 0.71 2.73 0.42 25.58
Hana 10.37 5.38 0.72 2.59 2.67 25.96
HSBC 9.09 5.81 0.80 2.86 1.47 26.11
IBK 10.30 5.47 0.64 2.48 2.42 25.64
ING 7.91 5.94 1.01 3.39 0.40 26.29
JPMorgan 8.55 5.59 0.85 3.03 1.31 25.44
KDB 10.34 5.33 0.64 2.42 2.62 25.64
KEXIM 10.25 5.42 0.65 2.46 2.51 25.64
Kookmin 10.53 5.36 0.62 2.50 2.56 25.96
Lehman Brothers 8.30 6.39 0.49 2.34 0.00 25.62
Mizuho 9.62 5.70 0.52 2.42 1.02 26.29
Morgan Stanley 8.76 5.77 0.79 2.88 0.31 25.78
Nomura 8.74 6.04 0.70 2.71 0.56 25.89
Santander 8.96 5.92 0.72 2.91 0.87 26.09
Scotia 4.93 3.96 0.99 4.10 0.00 20.38
Shinhan 10.52 5.51 0.61 2.33 2.20 25.96
SocGen 9.27 5.62 0.79 2.97 1.62 26.07
Standard Chart. 9.76 5.69 0.60 2.63 1.60 26.29
Tokyo Mitsu. 9.90 5.65 0.44 2.30 1.82 26.29
UBS 9.77 5.59 0.61 2.77 0.80 26.04
Unicredito 7.19 5.87 1.14 3.60 0.24 26.29
Woori 10.45 5.67 0.51 2.25 2.60 25.96
Total 9.11 5.77 0.68 2.71 0.00 26.29
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Figure 2: Risk-Stability Index Time-Series for Individual US Banks. The vertical dashed lines indicate,
from left to right: Bankruptcy of New Century Financial; Implosion of Bear StearnsHedge Funds;
Collapse of Bear Stearns; Collapse of Lehman Brothers.
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Figure 3: Risk-Stability Index Time-Series for Individual European Banks. The vertical dashed lines
indicate, from left to right: Bankruptcy of New Century Financial; Implosion of Bear StearnsHedge
Funds; Collapse of Bear Stearns; Collapse of Lehman Brothers.
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Figure 4: Risk-Stability Index Time-Series for Individual Asian Banks. The vertical dashed lines
indicate, from left to right: Bankruptcy of New Century Financial; Implosion of Bear StearnsHedge
Funds; Collapse of Bear Stearns; Collapse of Lehman Brothers.
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